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I INTRODUCTION 
"There is no private life which has not been determined by a wider public life." 1 
George Eliot, 1866. 
As a female novelist forced by the prevailing social conditions to create a public 
identity as a male, none may have known that better than George Eliot, that what is 
'private' and what is 'public' is neither absolute nor particularly easy to define. 
The same is true in law, and the requirement of facts being 'private' is the complicated 
stumbling block to New Zealand's developing tort of invasion of privacy. The tort's 
main elements are generally agreed to be the public disclosure of private facts of an 
offensive and objectionable nature.2 Unfortunately what deems a fact 'private' as 
opposed to 'public' is not yet certain, and problems surrounding the classification of 
facts are yet to be comprehensively considered in a New Zealand court. 
I intend to look closely at this central requirement ("the public disclosure of private 
facts") and apply that to situations that are ostensibly public. The case law has already 
signaled that in some situations what appears public may be said to have become 
private again for the purposes of the tort, for example the criminal convictions in 
Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd3 , or the previously published information about 
a woman's past in TV3 Network Services v BSA4• As stated in Todd: "It would appear 
then, that public facts may be transformed into private ones ... "5 
It is the exact nature of this transformation from public to private that comprises the 
object of this paper. Therefore I will be considering three different categories of fact, 
each of which appear at first sight obviously public due to either (1) prior publication 
in the media, (2) existence on a public record, or (3) by being photographed in a 
public place. As a fourth category I will consider facts which are generally of a 
1 Elizabeth Knowles (ed) Oxford Book of Qu01a1ions (5 ed. Oxford University Press. Oxford, 1999). 
2 Bradley v Wingnut Films Lld [1993) l NZLR 415,424 (HC) per Gallen J [Bradley v Wingnut] 
3 Tucker v News Media Ownership [ 1986) 2 NZLR 716 (HC) [Tucker v News Media] 
4 7Y3 Network Services v BSA [1995) 2 NZLR 720 (HC) [7Y3 v BSA] 
5 Stephen Todd (ed) The I.Aw of Torts in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, Wellington, 1997) 
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private nature, yet are somehow connected to a public figure thereby obtaining some 
type of public status. 
By considering each category of public status separately I hope to develop an outline 
for applying to fact situations when deciding whether something could possibly have 
become 'private' again for the purposes of the tort. The fifth and final part of this 
paper will examine the difficulty in treating the terms 'public' and 'private' as 
absolutes, and suggest alternative formulation of the test for breach of privacy. 
A Sources 
1 New Zealand 
As there are so few New Zealand cases dealing with this region of law, I will also be 
including decisions of the Broadcasting Standards Authority because "other legal 
developments overlap with and can influence the developing tort."6 The United 
Kingdom does not yet recognise a tort of privacy in this form 
1 The United States 
United States case law is also a helpful comparison particularly because the origins of 
the tort stem from there. 
In a majority of jurisdictions in the United States, invasion of privacy exists at 
common-law and encompasses four distinct torts: (1) intrusion on seclusion; (2) 
public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light in the public eye; and (4) 
misappropriation of a person's name or likeness. 7 
With the Supreme Court of the United States decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp v 
Cohn8 , the question of whether facts on the public record can become private again 
was thrown into doubt. The central issue was whether the First and 14th Amendments 
of the United States Constitution prohibited the imposition of tort liability for a public 
disclosure of the identity of the deceased victim of a rape which was taken from a 
public indictment. In that case the Court ruled that the Amendments in question 
6 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New l.ealand (4 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999) 178. 
7 W. P Keeton (ed) Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts (5 ed, West Publishing Co, St Paul, 1984) 851-865. 
8 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v Cohn (1975) 420 US 469, 499 
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"command nothing less than that States may not impose sanctions for the publication 
of truthful information contained in official records open to public inspection."9 
Prosser and Keaton on Torts indicates that a fact should not receive "widespread 
publicity if it does not involve a matter of public concem" 10 merely because the 
information was found on a public record or occurred in a public place. 
The United States cases discussed in this paper do not give a statement on the 
established position of the law in this area, because as illustrated above it is one which 
varies across State jurisdiction, and academic opinion. The cases still provide a useful 
point of contrast in this area and give an indication of recent judicial thinking on 
issues New Zealand courts have not yet addressed. Yet it is important to take note of 
Jeffries J's forewarning in Tucker v News Media that the tort' s "boundaries and 
exceptions will need much working out on a case by case basis so as to suit the 
conditions of this country." 11 
II PUBLIC THROUGH PRIOR MEDIA PUBLICATION 
A New Zealand Case Law 
I Contemporaneous Publication 
Tucker v News Media, the first case of its kind in New Zealand in that it allows the 
possibility of a separate tort of invasion of privacy, covers two fact categories. The 
criminal convictions which Mr Tucker sought to prevent disclosure of were available 
both on public record and through prior publication in the media. No final injunction 
was granted, given that Radio Windy, Radio Pacific, and newspapers in Sydney had 
been broadcasting the alleged convictions. McGechan J paid particular attention to 
the nature of the New Zealand media in that "[o]nce the proverbial cat is out of the 
bag her progeny spread like lightning."12 Although McGechan J was in agreement 
with the general principle that courts should not allow the resumption of a wrong 
simply because other such wrongs have occurred in the meantime, he based his refusal 
9 Cox Broadcasting Corp v Cohn above n 8, 495 . 
10 W.P.Keaton, above n 7, 859. 
11 Tucker v New Media, above n 3, 733 . 
12 Tucker v News Media, above n 3, 736. 
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to allow the injunctions to continue on the basis that this situation required 
"equalisation vis-a-vis their unrestrained competitors." 13 
Tucker v News Media appears to me to be a case decided on the basis that the prior 
publication was actually contemporaneous to the case and of news currency at that 
time, therefore highlighting the futility in attempting to restrain two mediums when 
one (radio) was able to broadcast the information nationwide. 
2 'Slender ' Publication 
In the case of TV3 v BSA14 , TV3 screened a programme dealing with incest which 
focussed on a man who had been convicted of sexual offences on his five daughters. 
The girl ' s mother, Mrs S, had given evidence in court that she too had been a victim 
of incest two years previously. A weekly magazine published an old photo of Mrs S 
at that time, but none of the other news publications referred to S by her present name. 
The TV3 programme showed footage of the reporter attempting to interview Mrs S. 
Mrs S complained to the Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) that TV3 had failed 
to comply with its responsibility to maintain the appropriate privacy standards. The 
complaint was upheld and TV3 appealed to the High Court on the grounds that the 
information that Mrs S had been a victim of incest was already in the public domain 
due to the fact there had been prior disclosure in the media and because she had given 
evidence in court. 
The question of interest in this case is whether a magazine article from two years 
previous prevents someone from claiming a breach of privacy according to the 
Broadcasting Standards. The BSA originally found that, despite the previous article, 
the information had become private again, caused by the "continuation of the name 
suppression order." 15 This case differs from the situation in Tucker v News Media 
where the information was being published elsewhere at the same time and on a 
nationwide scale, because publication relating to the abuse suffered by Mrs S had been 
limited. The two previous occasions of publication were a newspaper circulating 
13 Tucker v News Media, above n 3, 736. 
14 1V3 v BSA, above n 4. 
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locally which gave a contemporary report of the court case and a magazine article in a 
weekly publication, which consisted largely of an old photo of Mrs S and an interview 
with her eldest daughter. Eichelbaum CJ chose to balance these publications with the 
fact that several other publications, although covering similar ground relating to the 
daughters and the court case, did not refer to the mother' s own experiences. 16 This 
was taken as an indication that the suppression order, while covering her daughters, 
had remained in force. 
Therefore, as public identification with the facts to Mrs S were "slender"17 and name 
suppression of her daughters in the court case effectively resulted in her identity 
retaining a significant degree of privacy also, Eichelbaum CJ found no reason why 
other members of the media should be allowed to "exacerbate any damage by 
following suit." 18 
To contrast this, although the information in question in Tucker v News Media was 
arguably as equally damaging, it had in fact "obtained widespread notoriety" through 
the breadth of its publication "so as to make it an exercise in futility" 19 by the Courts 
to prevent others publishing the same information. 
3 Public interest in prior publication 
Eichelbaum CJ's sentiments are echoed in Morgan v TVNZ Ltd2° in which a seven 
year old girl was protected from further media scrutiny in a documentary which 
covered how she had been forced into hiding in New Zealand. Despite evidence of 
extensive prior publicity submitted by TVNZ, Holland J found that "the continuation 
of publication, even by way of repetition of events of this girls' private life, was likely 
to cause substantial harm to her. "21 It is relevant to note Holland J' s finding that 
subsequent publications in the newspaper had been given "a great deal more 
prominence than the facts deserve,"22 indicating that he is bringing in an element of 
15 TV3 v BSA, above n 4, 726. 
16 TV3 v BSA, above n 4, 729. 
17 TV3 v BSA, above n 4, 730. 
18 TV3 v BSA. above n 4, 730. 
19 Tucker v News Media, above n 3, 736. 
20 Morgan v TVNZ Ltd (I March 1990) High Court Christchurch CP 67/90 Holland J [Morgan v TVNZJ 
2 1 Morgan v TVNZ. above n 20, 4. 
22 Morgan v TVNZ, above n 20, 5. 
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his views on its newsworthiness. By bringing what appears to be a consideration of 
public interest into his discussion of degree of publication, Holland J is provoking the 
question of whether judges are finding it easier to deal with the public/private 
distinction by importing the public interest limb into the analysis. 
An assessment of prior breadth of publication is a difficult one, and Morgan v TVNZ 
illustrates the refusal of one judge to allow prior publication to prevent an injunction 
where a projected programme has the potential to be "social and emotionally 
detrimental"23 to a child. This was accompanied by a public interest analysis in which 
he concluded that "there was no real public interest in the transmission of this 
programme. "24 
The idea of exacerbating, or continuing damage by publishing facts which were 
previously given either 'slender' or considerably less media coverage, in order to 
protect a plaintiff who is in some way vulnerable, is argued once more in the more 
recent case of A v TVNZ25• This case involved a young woman who had made false 
allegations of a sexual offence only one year previously. This case is interesting as 
unlike the previous two, the central factor was not the smaller scale of the previous 
publication, but the fact that she had since moved away from the particular area of 
publication in a deliberate effort to put the past behind her. 
A gave evidence that she had experienced weight loss in learning that TVNZ were to 
make a programme about the man she had made the allegations about, revealing also 
her identity. However TVNZ tried to distinguish this from the situation in Tucker v 
News Media because "the facts upon which the proposed publication were focused [in 
Tucker] were buried in the past,"26 whereas here the facts were reasonably recent. 
The court found that she had already paid the penalty for her offence, and by having 
the facts revived now in a different medium, with wider penetration of the public than 
the medium which published details of her offence at the time, the consequences for 
23 Morgan v TVNZ, above n 20, 3. 
24 Morgan v TVNZ, above n 20, 7. 
25 A v TVNZ Ltd (25 March 1996) High Court Wellington CP 55/96 Doogue J. 
26 A v TVNZ Ltd, above n 25 , 7. 
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her in the place where she now lived could "plainly be considerable and 
detrimental."27 The interest in protecting A from being punished twice for her crime is 
yet another factor which seems to be unrelated to the primary issue of whether its in 
the public domain or not. 
The decision to protect her identity relied also on s139 of the Crimes Act and while 
the judge agreed that the offence was not buried in the past as in Tucker v News 
Media, it was found that "this is a very young woman who has moved on and by 
moving on has put the events as effectively in the past as could be done."28 
5 Conclusion on New Zealand case law 
It is difficult to draw any solid conclusions from these four cases, remembering that 
one of them is really only supposed to be ruling on the ability of the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority to make and apply the standard. 
The most helpful statement of all in this area comes from that case, TV3 v BSA in 
which Eichelbaum CJ observes that in determining whether "information has lost its 
private character it would be appropriate to look realistically at the nature, scale and 
timing of previous publications."29 
This has generally been adhered to m each of the judgments dealing with prior 
publication in the media, as it is commonly agreed that publication in the form of a 
'slender' mention in a weekly woman's magazine (TV3 v BSA), or a news report in 
another area or of much smaller significance to the one proposed (A v TVNZ and 
Morgan v TVNZ) is not sufficient to remove the information's 'private character'. 
Tucker v News Media leaves the question open to some extent, however rules out 
situations where the information has already been disclosed nationwide in one news 
medium in a situation of current interest, rendering further protection futile anyway. 
27 A v TVNZ Lid, above n 25 , 7. 
28 A v TVNZ Lid, above n 25 , 7. 
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B The Broadcasting Standards Authority Decisions 
The Broadcasting Standards provide in Principle (ii) for the protection of public facts 
which have "in effect become private again."30 Through BSA decisions it has become 
evident that information previously disclosed in the media may be held to lie in the 
public domain. For example in Bowen v TVNZ31 , an item covering a dispute by 
neighbours over a noisy parrot appeared in a local newspaper before the Holmes' 
show about which an unsuccessful privacy complaint was made. 
1 Relevant Factors 
However previous disclosure as a defence will rely on a number of factors, such as 
extent, nature and timing of the previous publication. In Ms P32 , two of the five 
daughters who had not assented to be interviewed for the 20/20 item referred to in the 
TV3 v BSA case, complained that their privacy had been breached by the disclosure 
that they too had been victims of incest. Their complaint was upheld despite prior 
publication, and it was decided that publication in localised media or weekly as 
opposed to daily publications may be relevant33 This reconciles with Bowen v TVNZ 
as the prior publication there was not only contemporaneous, but actually in the 
couples local media. 
In the case of Earlly v Radio Pacific Ltd,34 an eight-year-old murder conviction was 
not held to be a private fact because it had been widely covered by the media at the 
time and nothing had occurred to make the events private again. This seems to shift 
the emphasis, as decisions such as TV3 v BSA35 appear to assume that facts can 
naturally become private as time lapses. 
2 'Retaining' privacy or 'obtaining' it? 
This does not fit well with a Tucker v News Media fact situation either. The publicity 
surrounding Mr Tucker's convictions nine years earlier was not considered, nor were 
29 7Y3 v BSA, above n 4, 731. 
30 Broadcasting Standards Authority Advisory Opinion Privacy Principles 1996, Principle (ii) 
31 Bowen v 7YNZ (1997) unreported, Broadcasting Standards Authority, Decision No 1997/032. 
32 Ms P(28 April 1994)unreported, Broadcasting Standards Authority, Decision No 1994/021. 
33 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media law in New Zealand (4 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999) 184-185. 
34 Earlly v Radio Pacific Ltd (23 June 1994) unreported, Broadcasting Standards Authority, Decision No 1994/043. 
35 7Y3 v BSA, above n 4, 731. 
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any intervening events beside the discovery of the convictions in the weeks preceding. 
Eichelbaum CJ in TV3 v BSA certainly considers the fact situation on the basis that 
nothing had intervened from the time of the news reporting of Mr Tucker's original 
court case eight years before, to prevent the information "retaining a significant degree 
of privacy."36 
Perhaps it would make more sense if the court looked at it from the perspective of the 
media interest in the murder conviction over the period of eight years and the extent to 
which it had remained in public memory through media revival over that period. 
This analysis is predominantly concerned with the breadth of publication, but it is 
valuable to remember that a better reasoning for publication in the situation of murder 
convictions, may be the magnitude and seriousness of the crime, a consideration in the 
public interest assessment of a situation. 
3. Formulating a test 
Ursula Cheer notes in Media Law in New Zealand that37 
it is not sufficient simply to identify an arbitrary cut-off point as a 
determining factor in these cases, other factors will be relevant such as the 
nature of the offence, the public 's right to know, the extent and continuation 
of publicity and the individual's right to put the past behind them. 
She also notes that whilst decisions of the BSA depend largely on the specific facts of 
each issue, where trends have been identified they tend to be consistent with the 
developing tort. 38 
C United States Case Law 
The United States position indicates less privacy protection for a plaintiff whose 
information has previously been published in the media. 
Privacy Law theorist David Elder has summarised the law in this area as providing 
"substantial protection to subsequent media or non-media republishers of information 
36 7V3 v BSA, above n 4, 730. 
37 Burrows, above n 6, 186. 
38 Burrows, above n 6, 186. 
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previously published by another media entity."39 As an illustration of this he cites the 
case of Heath v Playboy Enterprises Inc. 40 
When Playboy published a photograph of a minor, Christal Carson (illegitimate 
granddaughter of Johnny Carson, the late night talk show host) in their "The Year in 
Sex" issue, her guardian brought an invasion of privacy action against the magazine. 
Here, prior publication consisted of news reporting at the time of the paternity action 
three years previously. It was held that "[r]epublication of facts already publicized 
elsewhere cannot provide a basis for an invasion of privacy claim."41 
On the basis of the New Zealand approach to cases involving this category of fact , and 
under a Morgan v TVNZ analysis, (the public interest consideration of protecting a 
minor from unwarranted publication or this scope) Christal's guardian may have had a 
better chance of success in her claim. 
D Category One (Media) Conclusion 
So to conclude, it may be helpful to assess whether information, despite being 
previously published in the media, is still public on the basis of two considerations: 
1) The degree of the prior publication. This will include how long ago, (only at the 
time of the event in the form of news reporting?), in what mode of publication, (a 
mention in a weekly magazine or an in-depth documentary?), and how widespread 
publication was (or was it limited to the town in which the event occurred and the 
plaintiff has since moved away). 
2) Balancing the public's legitimate interest in knowing the information against the 
individual's reasons for protecting their privacy in that situation, or the steps he or 
she may have taken to put the event behind him or her. 
It is important to note here that when the interim injunction was granted in Tucker v 
News Media, Jeffries J regarded the tort of invasion of privacy as a "natural 
39 David A Elder The Law of Privacy (Lawyer Cooperative Publishing, Rochester, 1991) 172. 
40 Heath v Playboy Enterprises Inc (1990) 732 F Supp 1145, (SD FLA). 
41 Heath v Playboy Enterprises Inc, above n 40, 1149. 
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progression"42 from the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Injury to 
ones "feelings and peace of mind" was therefore at "[t]he gist of the action."43 Since 
the case of Bradley v Wingnut, the tort encompasses the need for the disclosure ( or the 
facts) to be "highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person"44 Therefore it 
must be remembered that the standard or interest in protecting privacy must be quite 
high in order to justify restraining the media's right to freedom of expression. Heart 
conditions (Tucker v News Media45), and detrimental weight loss caused by extreme 
stress (A v TVNZ46) has been found to be sufficient, whereas mere embarrassment and 
outrage was not (Marris v TV3 Network Services Ltd). 47 
III PUBLIC THROUGH EXISTENCE ON A PUBLIC RECORD 
"It is estimated each person has more than 200 separate files containing personal 
information about him or herself."48 Public record information is to some degree 
public "in the descriptive sense that any one of us can look it up ... however it is also 
descriptively private to the extent that it remains unknown."49 
A The Two Extremes of 'Public' on Public Record 
In his analysis of the assumption that what is on the public record is 'public' for the 
purposes of the American tort, WA Parent found that; "What belongs in the public 
domain cannot without glaring paradox be called private and consequently should not 
be incorporated within a viable conception of privacy."50 
42Tucker v News Media, above n 3, 731 .. 
43 Tucker v News Media, above n 3, 732 per Jeffries J. 
44 Bradley v Wingnut, above n 2, 424 per Gallen J. 
45 Tucker v News Media, above n 3, 734 per McGechan J. 
46 A v TVNZ Ltd, above n 25 , 6 Doogue J. 
47 Marris v TV3 (14 October 1991) High Court Wellington CP 754/91 , 8 [Marris v TV3] Neazor J. found the harm suffered by 
the plaintiffs to be no higher than ' upset and anger' therefore distinguishing it from the facts in Tucker v News Media 
48 Burrows. above n 6, 172. 
49 Elizabeth Paton-Simpson "Private Circles and Public Squares: Invasion of Privacy by the Publication of 'Private Facts"' 
(1998) MLR 318,326. 
50 W.A.Parent "A New Definition of Privacy for the Law" (1983) 2 Law & Phil 305, 307 in Paton Simpson, above n 49, 326. 
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However it must also be noted as Stanley Ingbar does m his examination of the 
subject that: 51 
There is a very real difference between the disclosure of a 
personal fact in a dusty public record hidden somewhere in the 
bowels of a county courthouse and a similar disclosure 
disseminated through the mass technology of the modern press. 
B New Zealand Case Law 
It has already been suggested in New Zealand courts that facts which are on the public 
record have the capacity to become "private over time."52 Yet there is even less case 
law in this category to illustrate how this is to operate. 
1 Considering convictions 
The central case in this category is Tucker v News Media Ownership, in which two 
different High Court judges and the Court of Appeal all considered there was a tenable 
argument that the publication of a person's criminal convictions from many years 
earlier could constitute a tortious breach of privacy, even though the accused's name 
had not been suppressed and it was in open court. Whilst this case may sit better in 
terms of a category one analysis, it is helpful to view it strictly in terms of the criminal 
convictions aside from the media publication. 
The emphasis in this case seems to be that in the nine years since the convictions, Mr 
Tucker had gone on to live an ordinary private life and therefore had a right to be left 
alone and to "live the private aspects of his life without being subjected to 
unwarranted public disclosure."53 If this is right, that the outcome turns on the extent 
to which someone has been accepted back into the community and rehabilitated in the 
years subsequent, then it would be a difficult test. This sentiment is reinforced in A v 
TVNZ where the ruling is based not only on the small scale of prior publication, but 
more importantly the idea that A had "moved on" and put the events "as effectively in 
51 Stanley Ingber "Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy'' (1985) 73 Cai 2 Rev 772, 848-849 in Paton-Simpson, 
above n 49,327. 
52 Tucker v News Media, above n 3, 716 per McGechan J 
53 Tucker v News Media, above n 3, 731 per Jeffries J. 
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the past as could be done."54 It was indicated in the judgment that if TVNZ's 
projected programme had been proposed within the immediate time frame of 
sentencing and before A had changed her place or residence "in an effort to put it all 
behind her"55 the court would not have granted an injunction. The emphasis again is 
for the court to look at the "overall justice"56 of the situation. 
C Broadcasting Standards Authority Decisions 
It is useful to see how the BSA has dealt with the issue, bearing in mind that Principle 
(ii) of the Privacy Principles already provides for the possibility of 'public' facts 
becoming 'private' again in some circumstances. As mentioned earlier, the case of 
Earlly v Radio Pacific Ltd57 found an eight year old murder conviction not to be 
private because nothing had occurred to make the events private again since the initial 
media furor. However, in the later case of Drury and Daisley v TV3 Network Services 
Ltd, 58 twelve years was deemed sufficient to make an allegation of a sexual offence a 
private matter. 
Ursula Cheer disagrees with any attempt to apply an arbitrary cut-off point in cases 
concerning disclosure of public records such as criminal convictions, and prefers 
instead a consideration of factors such as "the nature of the offence, the public's right 
to know, the extent and continuation of publicity and the individual's right to put the 
past behind them."59 
Such a case by case consideration of factors may serve to do no more than dress up an 
entirely subjective outcome, and yet it is far too dangerous to specify nine years as 
being a suitable time lapse equation in every case. It is unfair to subject news media 
organisations to such a wavery line of assessment, and equally as unfair to place a 
blanket number on the years to have lapsed due to the huge variance in both victims 
rights to air their stories and their perpetrators' rights to lead a life without crime, a 
54 A v TVNZ Ltd, above n 25, 7 Doogue J. 
55 A v TVNZ Ltd, above n 25, 5 Doogue J. 
56 A v TVNZ Ltd, above n 25, 7 Doogue J. 
51 Earlly v Radio Pacific Ltd (23 June 1994) unreported, Broadcasting Standards Authority, Decision No 1994/043. 
58 Drury and Daisley v 1V3 Network Services Ltd (1996) unreported, Broadcasting Standards Authority, Decision No 1996/130. 
59 Burrows, above n 6, 185. 
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condition of which may be to remain unjudged and on equal footing away from where 
people know that part of their past. 
Cheer raises the important point of the public ' s right to know. The defendant may 
argue as a defence that publication is justified because the public has an interest in the 
truth being revealed, however 'newsworthiness ' is not the test. In Morgan v 1VNZ, 
Holland J finds that the fact that other news agencies had given prominence to the 
facts was irrelevant to a public interest consideration as "it is not for this Court to 
impose matters of taste on the news media,"60 only to assess whether the public 
interest exceeds that of the privacy of the individual.61 The direction assumed in both 
Tucker v News Media and A v 1VNZ seems to favour a balancing of interests also. 
D The United States Case Law 
I The Rehabilitation Exception 
In the United States case of Melvin v Reid, 62 a cause of action based on the tort of 
privacy survived a striking out application notwithstanding that the facts had been 
made public during a trial seven years previously. The case involved a film which 
was held to breach privacy when it revealed the name and present whereabouts of a 
woman who was a prostitute and defendant in a notorious murder trial several years 
earlier. She had since married and established herself in new social circles where no 
one knew of her past. So what was once of legitimate public interest, had been 
transformed by time into a private matter. However as observed by Eichelbaum CJ in 
1V3 v BSA, the case "doesn't really take the matter further than Tucker."63 
In Briscoe v Readers Digest Association64 the plaintiff' s convictions had occurred 11 
years earlier and were mentioned as part of a story on truck hijacking. The California 
Supreme Court held that there may be an exception to the admissibility of public 
record publication where the person who is the involuntary focus of public interest 
60.Morgan v TVNZ. above n 20, 5 
61 Morgan v TVNZ. above n 20, 6. 
62 Melvin v Reid (1931 ) 11 2 Cal App 285 , 297 
63 1V3 v BSA, above n 4, 731. 
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and attention has reverted to the "lawful and unexciting life led by the great bulk of 
the community."65 The Court conceded that the names of suspects or offenders of 
recent crimes were of legitimate public interest protected by the First Amendment.66 
However in cases of long past crimes it was found that the identity of the actor, 
"usually serves little independent public purpose".67 
2 The boundaries of the exception 
David Elder summarised the exception based on the Californian decisions as being 
confined to: 68 
1. Long past crimes or events in which the public interest had never wavered. 
2. Situations where there is a compelling interest in rehabilitation. 
3. Only the identity is protected so it will not apply if republication does not identify 
the rehabilitated person in his or her present setting. 
4. Situations were the convicted person had not voluntarily entered the public forum. 
This analysis seems to confirm that the exception is intended only for application to 
convictions, not all public record information, as Elder goes on to affirm that cases 
concerning no question of criminality or a rehabilitated criminal "have generally 
applied a liberal standard of newsworthiness or public interest."69 The reasoning for 
rehabilitation arguments can be found in Briscoe v Readers Digest as being based on 
the need to permit rehabilitated individuals to "melt into the shadows of obscurity"70 
in order to effectuate "the great and compelling social interest in rehabilitation."71 
E Legislating a Time Lapse 
In some jurisdictions, a simpler formulation of this exception 1s the automatic 
expungement statute. These vary from state to state and are often applicable where 
the person was a juvenile or has a low-level offence. After a certain number of years, 
64 Briscoe v Readers Digest Ass (1971) 483 P 2d 34, 40. 
65 Briscoe v Readers Digest Ass, above n 64, 40. 
66 Briscoe v Readers Digest Ass, above n 64, 39. 
61 Briscoe v Readers Digest Ass, above n 64, 41. 
68 David A Elder The Law of Privacy (Lawyer Cooperative Publishing, Rochester, 1991) 243-245 . 
69 Elder, above n 68 , 246 . 
70 Briscoe v Readers Digest Ass, above n 64, 41. 
71 Briscoe v Readers Digest Ass, above n 64,43 . 
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the conviction is written off the public record either automatically or within 
discretionary guidelines. Nandor Tanczos has introduced a Members Bill which has 
just been referred to the Justice and Electoral Select Committee. Going by the name 
of the 'Clean Slate Bill ', it applies to people with a conviction for which a sentence of 
six months or less (or a fine not exceeding $2000) has been imposed. The bill does not 
apply to any convictions for sexual offences or any convictions imposed against 
bodies corporate. If that person does not re-offend for seven years after the date of 
their last conviction, the conviction is automatically 'spent', which means they are not 
required to reveal any information about their spent conviction for any purpose. 
It would have relevance to this category of fact because the bill would also restrict 
those who can have access to such information rather than actually deleting the 
information from the record. Whilst police would still be able to bring information 
before a court when crimes of the same nature are involved, this is one of the few 
permitted public uses suggesting that if for example a person's conviction was 
discovered and widespread dissemination was threatened, a judge could easily assess 
it to be a 'private ' fact if the conviction in question was seven years ago and there had 
been no re-offending. Tanczos has argued the need for the Bill partly on the basis of 
estimates by John Whitty, (national director of the New Zealand Prisoners ' Aid and 
Rehabilitation Society), that one quarter of all adult males have a criminal conviction, 
with most falling into the category his bill covers.72 
F Beyond Convictions - General Public Record Disclosure 
1 Court Reports 
Each of the cases discussed so far in this part is concerned specifically with 
individuals wishing to conceal a past conviction, moreover they are facts not only on 
public record but having been reported in the news many years previously. 
It is relevant to contrast them with an important United States case in this area, The 
Florida Star v BJF73 in which the United States Supreme Court ruled on a situation in 
which a report identifying BJF by her full name which concerned a sexual assault was 
72 "Cleaning the Slate - Why We Should Wipe Old Minor Convictions" The New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 7 
March 2001 , 12. 
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inadvertently left in the Sheriff's Department's press room. Although the facts in 
question were not on the 'public record,' this is a relevant case as the judge ruled on 
the basis that they were nevertheless 'publicly available', so the court found no breach 
of privacy. 
A reporter copied the information verbatim, even though she admitted in evidence that 
she knew she was not allowed to, and the signs in the room made it clear that the 
names of rape victims were not matters of public record and were not to be published. 
On the facts of the case, the information in the pressroom was only 'publicly 
available' in a very limited descriptive sense in that it was on the court records, and 
mass publication resulted in the victim receiving threatening telephone calls as well as 
unwanted attention from fellow workers and acquaintances. 74 She testified that the 
publicity forced her to move house, change her telephone number and seek police 
protection. 
One of the Court's three main considerations was "the fact that punishing the press 
for its dissemination of information which is already publicly available is relatively 
unlikely to advance the interests in the service of which the State seeks to act."75 
White J writing for the three-person dissent in the case claimed that the court majority 
had effectively "obliterated one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the 20th 
century"76(the tort of the publication of private facts). 77 If wholly private persons such 
as BJF could not recover, the judge doubted whether there "remained any private facts 
which persons may assume will not be published."78 
Elizabeth Paton-Smith in her critique of the case argues that this was a clear instance 
of privacy protection being denied in a clearly deserving case due to a "lack of 
consciousness"79 to the different senses attaching to what is considered public. 
73 The Florida Star v BJF (1989) 491 US 524. 
74 Paton-Simpson, above n 49, 322. 
15 The Florida Star v BJF , above n 73, 456. 
76 The Florida Star v BJF, above n 73, 2618 
77 Elder, above n 68 , 253 . 
78 The Florida Star v BJF , above n 73, 2618 
79 Paton-Simpson, above n 49, 322 
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This case illustrates the potential dangers of applying the 'private fact ' requirement 
too literally and ignoring the overall injustice in widely publishing the identifying 
information of a rape victim, particularly when the rapist remains unapprehended.80 
2 Identifying Information 
A case which addresses the issue of protecting identifying information from 
worldwide disclosure over the internet is The City of Kirkland v Sheehan. 81 
Mr Sheehan operated and published a political internet web site, which contained 
political information, some of which was critical of law enforcement agencies. The 
purpose of the site was to demand greater public accountability for police officers and 
official agencies. The web site included identifying information about Kirkland police 
officers and city officials, including social security numbers, pay rates, birth months, 
home addresses, and home phone numbers. Plaintiffs based their claim on invasion of 
privacy. Unlike criminal convictions, the disclosure of which has generally been 
considered to be objectionable, the issue here was whether disclosure of identifying 
information would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.82 
However the court found that no invasion of privacy can be shown where the alleged 
'private' information was in the public domain or a matter of public record before the 
information was publicised by the defendant. All the facts published on the website 
about the police officers and city officials had been culled from sources available to 
the public. "The authors of the web site did not find Plaintiff Markle' s social security 
number by peering through his bedroom window. They found it in federal bankruptcy 
records."83 
2 New Zealand's position on identifying information 
Considering whether such information would be provided with privacy protection in a 
New Zealand setting is uncertain. However the BSA has ruled that while a person ' s 
name, address, telephone number and appearance are a public fact (Earnshaw v TVNZ 
80 Elder, above n 68 , 253 . 
81 City of Kirkland v Sheehan (10 May 2001) unreported,(Case No. 01-2-09513-7 SEA)(Washington), Alsdorf J at 
<http://www.justicefiles.org.htm> 
82 City of Kirkland v Sheehan, above n 82, para 50-56. 
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Ltd84), Principle (ii) of the Broadcasting Standards provides now that where the name 
and address is not necessary for the news item it renders such facts private. 
G Category Two (Public Records) Conclusion 
To conclude, information on the public record can be only notionally not descriptively 
public. Therefore it is not difficult to forsee that a reasonable person would object to 
the disclosure in mass media of details about their bad credit rating, failed marriages, 
name change and new address or embarrassing evidence about their personal 
relationships given in open court five years ago. However this in itself doesn't seem 
to warrant that public record information be given a narrower definition or some type 
of special exemption in a fact analysis . 
There needs to be a middle ground struck between the potential injustice at applying 
the 'private fact' requirement so restrictively that any information remotely notionally 
on the public record is automatically excluded from the tort, and on the other hand the 
uncertainty for media organisations of applying a vague 'Melvin-Briscoe ' exception. 
One way of deciding whether information which can be found on a public record is a 
private fact is to consider: 
1. The extent something on public record is descriptively public already, (taking into 
account accessibility, public knowledge at place of publication and time-lapse.) 
2. Weighed up against the public interest in having the facts disseminated. 
(Exceptions for public figures are discussed in the fourth category of fact.) 
The emphasis on identifying whether or not the facts contained on public record were 
either only notionally public or descriptively too acknowledges that a blanket 
exclusion to all public record information is too broad. 
83 City of Kirkland v Sheehan, above n 82, para 367. 
84 Earnshaw v TVNZ (1994) unreported, Broadcasting Standards Authority, Decision No 1994/034. 
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The requirement that the facts , or disclosure of them be highly objectionable is a 
better element under which to assess factors such as "moving on"(A v TVNZ85) , or 
rehabilitation, as one could argue that the objectionability of being identified increases 
significantly for a plaintiff who has taken obvious steps to lay what lies on record 
firmly in their pasts. 
IV PUBLIC THROUGH OCCUR/NG IN A PUBLIC PLACE 
Taking a photograph of a person in a public place or of their property without consent 
does not constitute publication of private facts (Marris v TV386) 
But the fact that the plaintiff is in a public place "does not automatically determine the 
issue"87 as illustrated by an Australian case which dealt with the issue in a slightly 
different context. 
In Barthurst CC v Saban Young J thought it might be open for an Australian court to 
give relief where a person was photographed surreptitiously in an embarrassing 
pose. 88 
It would seem to me that it would be . . . open to this Court . .. to give 
relief to a plaintiff who complained that someone had taken a photograph 
of him in a shockingly wounded condition after a road accident. .. or that 
she had been standing innocently over the air vent in a fun house and 
someone had photographed her with her skirts blown up. 
85 A v TVNZ Ltd, above n 25 , 7 Doogue J. 
86 Marris v 1V3, above n 46, 8. 
87 Burrows, above n 6, 176. 
20 
A New Zealand Case Law 
1 High standard of harm 
Todd observes that if the public activity published is of a personal and embarrassing 
kind, particularly if its beyond the control of the subject, "it may be less clear if it is 
public or private."89 
The case law in New Zealand has never had to specifically address this question in 
relation to a tort of privacy. In Marris v TV3 in which a couple were surreptitiously 
filmed declining to give an interview, it was the "manner and circumstances"90 of 
filming which the couple objected to. Because the filming took place from the bushes 
and the camera was on a public footpath, it was decided that a cause of action "does 
not arise simply from observation or the taking of a photograph at least from a place 
where the photographer has a right to be."91 • 
In Marris v TV3, strong emphasis is placed on the fact that the couple suffered 
minimal harm, and that no cause of action arises "simply from observation or the 
taking of a photograph" without proving considerable damage. The case may well 
have been different if what was surreptitiously filmed from the footpath was of a 
sufficiently objectionable standard such as the couple having sex. 
2 Surreptitious filming in the public interest 
Diane Fillian Knight, a television journalist for over 16 years, filed an affidavit saying 
that this approach was "proper" to bring a person's 'embarrassment and discomfort 
before the public"92 suggesting that when it is of such public import surreptitious 
filming of this kind is justifiable. 
It seems like a stretch of New Zealand's conception of public interest to find it 
existing in a refusal to be interviewed. Neazor J discusses the Australian case of 
88Barthurst CC v Saban (1985) 2 NSWLR 415,424 (HCA) per Young J. 
89 Todd, above n 5, 966. 
90 Marris v TV3, above n 46, 2. 
91 Marris v TV3, above n 46, 13. 
92 Marris v TV3, above n 46, 4. 
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Lincoln Hunt (Aust) Pty Ltd v Willesee93 in which the television reporter and camera 
team entered the offices of the plaintiff, which was found to be an act of trespass from 
the moment of entry as their motives were outside the implied licence. Public interest 
justifications were rejected, with Young J holding that "even if what the defendants 
were seeking to televise was one of great public interest that would not justify their 
entry."94 
This can be contrasted with the extent to which the Target television programme has 
stretched a public interest justification in filming. Targets producer Vincent Burke 
argues that they are entitled to surreptitiously film people in their work places, or in 
someone else's private home because the show "has helped raise the public ' s 
awareness about consumer rights."95 On the Lincoln Hunt analysis it would be 
interesting to see if such a defence would succeed in a New Zealand court even if the 
subject of filming was in a publicly accessible workplace. 
3 Public tombstone, public place ? 
In the case of Bradley v Wingnut96, the plaintiffs were arguing a breach of privacy 
among other things due to the fact that their ancestor' s tombstone was made part of 
the action of a particularly gruesome movie. The claim for protection under the tort 
failed partly on the grounds that the tombstone in question was in a public place, a 
public cemetery. Gallen J agreed that "there could scarcely be anything less private 
than a tombstone in a public cemetery."97 The whole point of a tombstone is a 
publication to all those who choose to read it of the facts which the inscription is 
designed to preserve. It was therefore found that it was not the actual tombstone in 
the film that was being objected to but the association to the activities in the film, 
more analogous then to defamation than privacy. 
However Gallen J went on to state his acceptance that: 98 
93 Uncoln Hunt (Aust) Pry LJd v Willesee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457 (SCA) per Young J. 
94 Lincoln Hunt (Aust) Pry LJd v Willesee, above n 94, 461. 
95 Steven Price ' 'Target's Hidden Cameras" Mediawatch Radio Programme, Wellington, New Zealand, 22 July 2001 , at 
<http://www.mediawatch.eo.nz/archive.htm> 
96 Bradley v Wingnut , above n 2. 
91 Bradley v Wingnut , above n 2. 416 . 
98 Bradley v Wingnut , above n 2, 424. 
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it is conceivable that in certain circumstances the fact that something 
occurred or exists in a public place does not necessarily mean that it 
should receive widespread publicity if it does not involve a matter of 
public concern. 
If for example, the clergyman had been impaled upon the Bradley's tombstone, rather 
than it simply being part of the ambience, the situation may have been different. 99 It 
was also reinforced as in Marris v TV3 that there is no right to prevent one person 
from simply photographing another. 
B Broadcasting Standards Authority Decisions 
Although the New Zealand courts have had little chance to specifically address the 
question of filming or photographing in public places, there exists a considerably 
wider scope of fact situations in the BSA decisions on this issue. 
In McAllister v TVNZ100 it was decided that the location of the incident is relevant, as 
conventionally filming, photographing or interviewing in a public place renders facts 
public not private. However the mere fact something occurs or exists in public does 
not make it something the public should know about. Ursula Cheer agrees that 
"involuntary and intimate details can be revealed in public and yet still be seen as 
private facts ."101 The standard of embarrassment or offensiveness is quite high though 
as illustrated by the decision in 44/93. 102 Photographs of the plaintiff's wedding from 
a former marriage were published for the first time many years after their separation, 
and his ex-wife had since developed a drug addiction and died in unusual 
circumstances. The marriage took place in a public place and was found to be very 
much a 'public' fact although public disclosure was now embarrassing, at the time it 
was not. 
99 Bradley v Wingnur, above n 2, 424. 
100 McAllisrer v TVNZ(l 990) unreported, Broadcasting Standards Authority, Decision No 1990/5 
101 Burrows, above n 6, 184. 
102 Michael Stace Privacy. /nrerprering rhe Broadcasring Srandards Aurhoriry 's Decisions (The Dunmore Press Ltd, 
Palmerston North, 1998) 34. 
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A further illustration of this is the case in 177/93,1°3 in which a television programme 
included extracts from an all-male strip revue and featured Mrs H, a member of the 
audience. The BSA found that the filming had occurred in a nightclub which was 
open to the public on payment of an admission fee and was therefore a public place. 
While embarrassing, the BSA found that her attendance there did not amount to an 
offensive point of fact. 
C The United States Case Law 
In his overview of this area of the law, David Elder finds that the bulk of United 
States case law indicates that there is "no liability where the matter publicized is in 
plain or public view for anyone to see." 104 
1 Expectations of privacy 
Whether or not a male strip review really is a 'public place ' seems questionable, and 
the question of qualifying private and public places was raised in a case from the 
California Supreme Court, Sanders v American Broadcasting Cos. , Inc. 105 Here the 
court considered the question of what happens when an employee who knows a 
conversation in an open office space will be overheard by coworkers, can pursue an 
invasion of privacy claim if that conversation is recorded by a reporters hidden 
camera. 
The case involved 'telephsychic' hotline workers who were secretly videotaped by an 
undercover reporter. Werdegar J rejected the notion of privacy as an 'all-or-nothing' 
concept and described an expectation of limited privacy even in such open settings. 
"There are degrees and nuances to societal recognition of our expectations of privacy: 
the fact the privacy one expects in a given setting is not complete or absolute does not 
render the expectation unreasonable as a matter of law."106 The court's ruling was not 
103 Stace, above n I 02, 34. 
104 Elder, above n 68, 167. 
105 Sanders v American Broadcasting Cos., Inc (1999). 978 P.2d 67 (Cal) 
106 Sanders v American Broadcasting Cos., Inc, above n 105, 69. 
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meant to imply that investigative journalists necessarily commit a tort by secretly 
recording events and conversations in offices, stores or other publicly accessible 
workplaces; however, the court's ruling allows the means of intrusion employed to 
collect the facts to determine "whether the subjective expectation of privacy was 
reasonable. " 107 
If a "quasi-public"108setting can encompass reasonable expectations of privacy m 
some circumstances, surely this can stretch to apply to public places too. 
2 Method of information retrieval 
This seems to endorse an assessment in situations such as this to determine to what 
extent the photographer, or recorder, had to go to in order to obtain the information. If 
they merely wandered up to a person and took their photo or filmed them in full 
knowledge of the other person, this would weigh against an assumption of privacy. 
On the other hand, anything of a surreptitious nature immediately suggests that the 
person from whom the information is sought may have objected in the first place, or 
the information itself is of a sufficiently private quality that it can only be gained this 
way. Under similar reasoning in a recent United Kingdom case, Laws J suggested that 
if for example a person thinks they are out of sight range and "someone with a 
telephoto lens were to take from a distance with no authority a picture of another 
engaged in some private act his subsequent disclosure would amount to a breach of 
privacy."109 
D Category Three (Public Places) Conclusion 
So to conclude so far, something occurring in a public place, may retain a degree of 
'private' character if a number of factors combine to allow it. These include the fact 
or activity itself must be of an extremely personal and embarrassing kind, capable of 
being highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person if disclosed, and 
107 Sanders v American Broadcasting Cos., Inc, above n 105, 69 
108 Elder, above n 68 , 168. 
109 Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 4 All ER 473,476 per Laws J (The case was actually based on an action 
for breach of confidence, there is no tort of invasion of privacy in the United Kingdom) 
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"beyond the plaintiff's control." 110 • The expectation of privacy may assist in proving 
what has been recorded retains a 'private' character. 
In order to synthesise the cases on 'public place' facts, I would suggest that the first 
consideration is: 
(1) whether the subject matter recorded is in itself of a sufficiently personal and 
embarrassing kind, and 
(2) whether the plaintiff can prove they had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
despite the public nature of the place. 
V PUBLIC THROUGH ASSOCIATION WITH A PUBLIC FIGURE 
Each of the three preceding fact categories, while not being entirely separate, cover the 
majority of case scenarios. A category relating to public figures then seems less to me 
like a separate fact situation, rather a factor which will assist in any public interest 
consideration 
A Public Figure Therefore Public Fact? 
From the inception of the tort with the case of Tucker v News Media, Jeffries J 
acknowledged the competing right for the public to be informed, especially when 
dealing with public figures. The distinction was based on a person who lives an 
ordinary private life having the right to be left alone. 111 While saying this is subject to 
certain exceptions he fails to name them. However it was proposed that "a person 
loses a right to privacy by presenting himself to the public eye for evaluation"112 In 
this case it was conceded however that Mr Tucker was 'a reluctant debutante' as far as 
public exposure was concerned so no weight was placed on this. 
110 Todd, above n 5,966. 
111 Tucker v News Media, above n 3, 731 per Jeffries J. 
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1 Public interest 
In the later case of Morgan v TVNZ, the girl involved was hardly a public figure, more 
the unfortunate recipient of media attention due to the circumstances surrounding a 
custody dispute over her. Holland J still cautioned that the right to privacy would 
need to be balanced against the public's conflicting right to be inforrned. 113 Again in 
Bradley v Wingnut Gallen J voiced the importance in "balancing the rights and 
interests of the individual against the significance in a free country of freedom of 
expression. "114 
In Media Law in New Zealand the "defence of public interest in publication"115 is 
listed as one of the tort's elements, stating that the defendant may argue this as a 
defence where publication is justified because the public has an interest in the truth 
being revealed. It was found that 'newsworthiness' is not the test, as it depended on 
public concern not pub.lie curiosity. As an illustration, Cheer 116cites the case of Sidis 
v FR Publishing Corp,u7in which the magazine The New Yorker exposed biographical 
details of a domestic nature about an ex child prodigy who decided he wanted to lead 
a life of anonymity. The facts in question were based on information that he had 
become an insignificant clerk with eccentric personal habits and "an interest in an 
obscure Indian tribe." 118 In the case Clark J held that: 119 
Revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victims 
position as to outrage the community's notion of decency. But when 
focused upon public characters, truthful comments upon dress, speech, 
habit, and the ordinary aspects of personality will not usually transgress this 
line. 
Cheer questions whether such an analysis means that in relation to public figures, the 
publication of such comments is not offensive because they are not private facts. 
112 Tucker v News Media, above n 3, 735 per McGechan J. 
113 Morgan v TVNZ, above n 20, 174. 
114 Bradley v Wing nut, above n 2, 423. 
115 Burrows, above n 6. 176. 
116 Burrows, above n 6, 176. 
117 Sidis v FR Publishing Corp (1940) 1 3 F 2d 806. 
118 Sidis v FR Publishing Corp, above n 117, 807. 
119 Sidis v FR Publishing Corp, above n 117, 807. 
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"The true effect of the judgment appears to be that comments on dress, speech etc. is 
the sort of information that would not be regarded as private facts, rather than that the 
disclosure of them is not offensive."120 
2 The United States 
The general direction of the law in the United States in this area as summarised by 
Prosser and Keeton indicates that if a person is in a position where public attention is 
focused upon them as a person, there is "no liability when they are given additional 
publicity as to matters legitimately within the scope of the public interest they had 
aroused." 121 Which seems to suggest that aspects of a persons life which fall within, or 
relate to their public role are to be considered public facts from the start. 
3 The Broadcasting Standards Authority 
In his book, Interpreting the Broadcasting Standards Authority's Decisions, 122 
Michael Stace observes that the disclosure in itself of facts about a newsworthy 
person, such as the details about a house or car was noted on several occasions by the 
Authority as being unlikely to amount to a breach of privacy. The facts disclosed had 
to also be "highly offensive and objectionable to a person of ordinary sensibilities." 123 
Both the decision in Sidis and the BSA are saying that the publication of basic facts 
about public characters will not violate privacy in circumstances where it might have 
done so had they been ordinairy people. 
In TV3 v BSA, Eichelbaum CJ thought the BSA was fit to impose the standard in 
question dealing with 'public' facts becoming private again, and thought that in this 
setting privacy should also include relief from individuals being harassed with the 
disclosure of past events having no sufficient connection with anything of present 
public interest. 124 On Michael Stace' s analysis, this does not appear to stretch to 
'newsworthy figures' on the basis that past events may have sufficient connection 
120 Burrows, above n 6, 177-178. 
121 Keeton, above n 7, 860 
122 Stace, above n 102. 
123 Stace. above n I 02, 87 . 
124 TV3 v BSA, above n 4, 729. 
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with present public interest if they reflect on that figure's ability to perform their 
public role. 
B P v D and the Public Figure 
This was of relevance in the recent New Zealand case of P v D 125 in which D is a 
journalist for the Sunday Star-Times and "P is a public figure." 126 In the process of 
investigating P he remembered hearing that they had at some stage been receiving 
treatment for a psychiatric illness. D approached one source who confirmed that this 
was a general belief, and that it was also generally believed that P had indeed been in 
a psychiatric facility and received treatment for a mental condition, and that there was 
one incident where a police officer came to the assistance of P. After D declined to 
submit a list of questions for an interview with P, nor the article to be submitted for 
P's approval prior to printing, P's counsel instituted proceedings for breach of 
confidence and invasion of privacy. 
In the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, section 14 is a right pertaining to 
freedom of expression, however it is not an absolute right and the Courts must utilise 
a balancing act in deciding to balance the freedom of expression and that of 
someone's privacy. In the case of Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review, 127 
the Court of Appeal discussed the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA), 
implying that nothing short of a total and full analysis of the NZBORA was required if 
there was statutory authority which would control the final result in the case. 
The Court in P v D does mention that privacy law requires a consideration of the 
public interest, and maybe this part could be linked to a NZBORA discussion, 
however any discussion of the NZBORA in P v D is very brief in light of Moonen. 
In terms of the public interest, the court merely states that any psychiatric background 
is not relevant to the current performance of P's job. The court does leave it open for 
the newspaper to re-open the question at a later date if facts regarding the public 
125 p v D 2 NZLR 591 (HC) per Nicholson J. 
126 p v D, above n 125,592. 
127 Moonen v Film and Uterature Board of Review, (2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA) per Elias CJ, Richardson P, Keith, Blanchard, 
Tipping JJ .[Moonen] 
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interest change (perhaps if the person starts showing signs of mental illness, or if P 
took on a position of public responsibility). But in this situation there was "minimal 
public interest in disclosure" because P' s mental health did not affect P ' s "occupation, 
character credibility or competence."128 
Gallen J' s recognition in Bradley v Wingnut of the need to bear in mind that the rights 
and concerns of the individual must be balanced against the right to freedom of 
expression 129 was emphasised in the case, as was the difficulty in formulating 
boundaries which would ensure both are appropriately recognised. 
A fourth element to the tort was proposed as being the "nature and extent of legitimate 
public interest in having the information disclosed."130 The nature and extent of 
legitimate public interest was seen to vary considerably and ranged from "idle 
curiosity and amusement" 13 1 to an assessment of whether the information affected a 
public individual's "character credibility and composure". Here it was found that 
while there was public interest in disclosure, legitimate public interest was 
"minimal." 132 
In the case itself it was found that the facts themselves were private, and disclosure of 
treatment in a psychiatric hospital would be highly offensive to a person of ordinary 
sensibilities. In stating the principle, supposedly from Bradley v Wingnut, the judge 
says that the facts themselves must be highly offensive (this is not what Wingnut 
held), but when applying this standard, concludes that publication of the facts would 
be highly offensive (which is the more logical standard). The discussion is a bit 
confused but he does not seem to be truly taking a different approach from Wingnut. 
It is difficult to ascertain any solid guidelines from P v D, simply because the nature of 
the case demands we cannot know the public figure, nor the facts in question, nor can 
we assess to what extent their past is of legitimate public interest. 
128 p v D, above n 125, 591 . 
129 Bradley v Wingnul, above n 2, 423 . 
130 p v D, above n 125, 601 . 
131 p v D, above n 125. 601. 
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CA New Zealand Direction? 
However in assessing how public figures differ from anyone else, the BSA's fifth 
privacy principle is a useful insight. "An individual who consents to the invasion of 
his or her privacy cannot later succeed in a claim for breach of privacy."133 
Lange v Atkinson134 is championed as the case which liberalised defamation law, 
recognising that "[t]he nature of New Zealand's democracy means that the wider 
public may have a proper interest in respect of generally-published statements which 
directly concern the functioning of representative and responsible government."135 For 
a tort of privacy to in any way restrict publication of the truth in relation to that seems 
ridiculous. Whilst it is not yet certain how broad the class of people La.nge relates to, 
it makes sense that P v D's 'legitimate public interest' standard be viewed in this light. 
Surprisingly, the public's expectation of this standard is almost as high as their own. 
In a Colmar Brunton survey conducted by the BSA, the filming of a member of the 
public by a hidden camera as he entered a strip club was judged unacceptable by 
73.7% of respondents, while 63.7% of people considered the secret filming of a 
politician in the same circumstances unacceptable.136 
As regards to all subject matter which does not affect an individual's "occupation, 
character, credibility or competence"137, it makes sense in light of principle five of the 
BSA, and obiter statements made in New Zealand courts which suggest one loses a 
right to privacy by "presenting himself to the public eye,"138 that a public figure must 
prove a higher standard of harm from disclosure. 
132 p v D, above n 125, 602. 
133 Broadcasting Standards Authority Advisory Opinion Privacy Principles 1996, Principle v. 
134 Lange v Atkinson [2000) 3 NZLR 385 (CA) per Richardson P, Henry, Keith, Blanchard, Tipping JJ . 
135 Lange v Atkinson above n 134, 100. 
136 Sam Maling "Concern About Privacy Tops List in BSA Survey" (l 999)>http://www.bsa.govt.nz.ht:ml> 
137 P v D, above n 125,601. 
138 Tucker v News Media, above n 3, 735. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
The dilemma in defining our developing tort of privacy's boundaries is due in part to 
the difficulty inherent in extracting the private from the public, or deciding when the 
public has transformed into the private. 
As indicated by the majority of cases discussed in this paper, the idea that public facts 
and private facts can exist in practice as separate entities is a theoretical fallacy. 
Fortunately New Zealand courts have already indicated a reluctance to follow the 
didactic adherence to the public/private distinction as illustrated in the United States 
case law. 
Eichelbaum CJ in TV3 v BSA acknowledges that "privacy is not an 'absolute' 
concept", and therefore requires a "liberal interpretation." 139 Similarly in P v D , by 
regarding each part of the test as a factor rather than a requirement, Nicholson J is 
favouring a more holistic approach to liability assessment. 
I agree with Elizabeth Paton-Simpson's reluctance to treat the terms 'public ' and 
'private ' as genuine opposites, because they are not after all "mutually exclusive 
categories . . . but matters of degree. " 140 
If the difference between the terms public and private is not absolute, rather a matter 
of degree, I think it is more logical to formulate a test for determining a breach of 
privacy with this assumption at its nucleus. 
Each concluding category analysis in this paper has confirmed that private and public 
are matters of degree. For facts published previously in the media, the emphasis was 
on the breadth of prior publication. Public record facts were more fairly assessed, by 
considering the degree to which they were descriptively public. Lastly for public 
place facts the importance was in evaluating the degree of expectation of privacy held 
by the plaintiff. 
1
: TV3 v BSA. above O 4, 73 J. 
1 
Paton-Simpson, above n 49, 324. 
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My suggestion for how to formulate a new way of looking at the 'private fact' 
requirement, which succeeds in assessing the degree of privacy in the information 
without relying on an inaccurate public/private dichotomy is this: 
1. (a)To what extent is the allegedly private fact already known? 
(To how many people? How long ago? Where? Publicly accessible? Memorable?) 
(b)To what extent would the proposed disclosure extend this knowledge? 
2. Will the disclosure of that particular information be highly offensive and 
objectionable to a person of reasonable sensibilities? 
The first part focuses solely on the current knowledge of the fact. The second part 
retains the objective standard, but clarifies that it looks only at disclosure, because as 
Ursula Cheer frames it, if disclosure of the information will significantly "expose or 
embarrass that individual , .. [it] is a good indication that something about it is 
inherently private.'>14' 
The public interest element would exist as a defence and incorporate a consideration 
of whether the facts deserve publication, relevant especially where the information 
relates to a public figure 
In writing that "there is no private life which has not been determined by a wider 
public life" George Elliot is recognising the obstacle inherent in attempting to define 
separately, societal concepts which can exist only within degrees of each other. 
14 1 Burrows, above n 6, 185 . 
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